Tuesday, September 12, 2006

Republicans Smell Defeat, Impeachment

The Voice of the White House

Washington, D.C., September 7, 2006:”With the frightening November mid term elections coming upon us, there has been a growing panic in senior, and junior, Republicans, both inside and outside of Congress. A probably loss of the House and a very possible loss of the Senate is stirring up panic. Why? Because there is no doubt that if the Democrats gain control of the House, there will be impeachment articles drawn up with Bush as their target and very probably serious investigations launched by them into certain senior Republicans for, among other matters, massive corruptions and bribery. There have been hinted at ‘October surprises’ which may or may not happen or, if they do, have any success. One of Cheney’s aides and I have become on good terms because I have connections outside of the White House he could make use of in the event of a major defeat. Cheney is a genuinely evil man who is primarily responsible for our present situation. We have lost face throughout the world, especially the Muslim world, but also throughout Asia and parts of Central and South America due to his vicious policies. Rumsfeld is rapidly becoming a cipher, due in part to his current illness and the very obvious fact that he is, to be nice, a very “confused man.” (Read pre-Alzheimer’s here). The military hate him with a passion because he treats all of them, top generals and all, like scum. Someone, and my new friend doesn’t know who, has suggested an interesting ploy to bolster Bush’s collapsing image (Cheney’s approval rating is now in single digits.)

The basic plan, as being formulated involving Bush, Cheney, Mehlman, Rove and some senior staff to include the new head of the CIA, General Hayden, is to have a splendid publicity coup that they feel would guarantee continued Republican control of both houses.

The idea, and I will admit it is awesome in its simplicity, is for the Administration to bribe the warring factions in Iraq to have a long truce during the course of which they will slow down or entirely stop their attacks on our military and each other.! This weird plan is indeed being “considered” but the chances of it ever seeing the light of day are absolutely zero. The Arabs would gleefully take out money…and then turn on us. The military would flatly agree to have anything to do with this and for certain, some minor player would go to the press.

Another plan is for Bush to tell the voting public how successful he and his grossly incompetent people have repeatedly saved, and will continue to save, their blessed Americans from numerous “terrorist attacks.’ There have not and are completely incapable of doing so. There is not one verifiable attack on record as either having been uncovered by the demoralized and depleted CIA or the utterly useless DHS. It is well-known all over Washington that the Bush people have paid ABC for a mini-series blaming Clinton for 911 while ignoring their own really serious role in it.

In law, there are two kinds of evidence: direct and circumstantial. A case of the former is an old lady, having been primed by the police stating that that person sitting over there was the man I saw shooting the nice policeman. The second type is for the pistol used to shoot the policeman being registered to the suspect, dozens of witnesses attesting to his intentions, bus tickets placing him at the scene and the fact that the slain officer had previously raped the man’s ten year old daughter. Any attorney with courtroom experience will tell you that circumstantial evidence trumps direct evidence every time.

That being the case, I can tell you that all the circumstantial evidence on pre-knowledge of the 9/11 attack very clearly points to the fact that George W. Bush, his top people, to include, Vice President Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, top advisor Karl Rove, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and very probably a number of other senior government persons had been well and very timely informed of the attack, when it would happen, where it would happen and how it would happen. That they did and said nothing but awaited the attack for the many political opportunities it would afford the President and the leadership makes all of them willing parties to murder. At law, this is called being an accessory before the fact.

Now, lest my readers believe that I am relying on wishful thinking or some nonsensical blog, I will supply as my brief, a long and thoroughly referenced listing addressing the issue of who knew what and when.

My suggestion is that one should read it and make up their own mind. We do not need the army of liars working for Bush or the ABC whitewash to think for us.

The Circumstantial Evidence

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing resulted in intelligence that indicated that Al Qaeda had planned the attack and was planning further attacks on bridges and tunnels in New York City.

1993: An expert panel commissioned by the Pentagon raises the possibility that an airplane could be used to bomb national landmarks. [Washington Post 10/2/01]

In 1995, an Al Qaeda group headed by one Ramzi Youssef, was planning to seize and blow up 12 commercial aircraft over the Pacific. One Abdul Hakim Murad, a co-conspirator of Youssef, admitted to U.S. authorities that he had been trained at American flight schools and had been involved in a plot to crash a commercial aircraft into the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia.

1998: U.S. investigators discover that Al Qaeda personnel involved in the Embassy bombings in Africa are part of a larger plan involving the training of terrorist members at American flight schools for attacks on American targets.

1998: The CIA ignore warnings from Case Officer Robert Baer, that Saudi Arabia is harboring an Al Qaeda cell led by two known terrorists. A more detailed list of known terrorists is offered to Saudi intelligence in August 2001 and refused. [Financial Times, January 12, 2001]

1998: An Oklahoma City FBI agent sends a memo warning that "large numbers of Middle Eastern males" are getting flight training and could be planning terrorist attacks. [CBS, 5/30/02] A separate CIA intelligence report asserts that Arab terrorists are planning to fly a bomb-laden aircraft into the WTC. [New York Times, 9/19/02; Senate Intelligence Committee, Witness Hill, 9/18/02]

December 1998: A Time magazine cover story entitled "The Hunt for Osama," reports that bin Laden may be planning his boldest move yet -- a strike on Washington or possibly New York City. [Time magazine, 12/21/98]

1999: It is learned that Al Qaeda personnel were plotting to blow up the Los Angeles International airport and selected targets in Jordan. Following the trial of an Al Qaeda man, Ahmen Ressam who was caught smuggling explosives into the United States, the FAA issues an official warning that Al Qaeda is expected to conduct explosive outrages against commercial aircraft or American airports.

Following this emerged a number of actual Al Qaeda threats against targets in the United States, often involving aircraft and aircraft facilities.

In the period just prior to the September 11 aircraft attack on American targets, numerous specific reports were delivered from what can only be termed entirely reliable foreign sources (as distinct from domestic intelligence reporting).

September 1999: A U.S. intelligence report states bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists could crash an aircraft into the Pentagon. The Bush administration claims not to have heard of this report until May 2002, although it was widely shared within the government. [CNN, 5/18/02, Associated Press, 5/18/01; Guardian, 5/19/02]

1999: MI6, the British foreign intelligence agency delivers a secret report to the London U.S. Embassy stating that Al Qaeda plans to use commercial aircraft "possibly as flying bombs." [Sunday Times, 6/9/02]

October 24-26, 2000: Pentagon officials carry out a "detailed" emergency drill based upon the crashing of a hijacked airliner into the Pentagon. [Source Military District of Washington News Service, 11/3/00] The White House later asserts that no one in government had envisioned a suicide hijacking. [Associated Press report, May 18, 2002]

January, 2001: The Bush Administration orders the FBI and intelligence agencies to "back off" investigations involving the bin Laden family, including two of Osama bin Laden's relatives (Abdullah and Omar) who were living in Falls Church, VA -- right next to CIA headquarters. This followed previous orders dating back to 1996, frustrating efforts to investigate the bin Laden family. [BBC “Newsnight,” Correspondent Gregg Palast, Nov 7, 2001]

Feb 13, 2001: UPI Terrorism Correspondent Richard Sale -- while covering a trial of bin Laden's al Qaeda followers -- reports that the National Security Agency has broken bin Laden's encrypted communications. Even if this indicates that bin Laden changed systems in February, it does not mesh with the fact that the government insists that the attacks had been planned for years.

May 2001: The U.S. introduces the "Visa Express" program allowing any Saudi Arabian to obtain visas through their travel agent instead of appearing at a consulate in person. Three to five hijackers use Visa Express over the next month to enter the U.S. [US News & World Report, 12/12/01, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, Witness Hill]

June 2001: German intelligence, the BND, warns the CIA and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists are "planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture." [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 14, 2001]

June 13, 2001: Egyptian President Mubarak, through his intelligence services, warns the U.S. that bin Laden's Islamic terrorist network is threatening to kill Bush and other G8 leaders at their July economic summit meeting in Italy. The terrorists plan to use a plane stuffed with explosives. [New York Times, 9/26/01]

Summer 2001: An Iranian man phones U.S. law enforcement to warn of an imminent attack on the World Trade Center in the week of September 9. German police confirm the calls but state the U.S. Secret Service would not reveal any further information. [German news agency online.de, September 14, 2001]

June 2001: German intelligence warns the CIA, Britain's MI6, and Israel's Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists are training for hijackings and targeting U.S. and Israeli symbols. [“Fox News,” 5/17/02]

June 26, 2001: The CIA informs the White House that they had intercepted foreign intelligence traffic concerning possible Al Qaeda strikes in America on July 4.

Summer 2001: Russian intelligence notifies the CIA that 25 terrorist pilots have been specifically training for suicide missions.

June 22, 2001: The military's Central and European Commands impose "Force Protection Condition Delta," the highest anti-terrorist alert.

June 28, 2001: National security advisor Condoleeza Rice states: "It is highly likely that a significant Al Qaeda, attack is in the near future, within several weeks."

July 1, 2001: Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee states that her staff had advised her of a “major probability of a terrorist incident within the next three months.” [Emphasis added]

July 2, 2001: The FBI reports to the White House that Al Qaeda terrorist attacks outside the United States are very possible and that domestic attacks could not be discounted.

July 5, 2001: The CIA informs President Bush that Al Qaeda attacks against American targets are entirely possible during the summer of that year.

July 5, 2001: The government's top counter-terrorism official, Richard Clarke states to a group gathered at the White House: "Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon." The group included the FAA, the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the INS. Clarke directs every counter-terrorist office to cancel vacations, defer non-vital travel, put off scheduled exercises and place domestic rapid response teams on much shorter alert.

July 10, 2001: A Phoenix FBI agent sends a memorandum warning about Middle Eastern men taking flight lessons. He suspects bin Laden's followers and recommends a national program to check visas of suspicious flight-school students. The memo is sent to two FBI counter-terrorism offices, but no action is taken. [New York Times, 5/21/02] Vice President Cheney says in May 2002 that he opposes releasing the memo to congressional leaders or to the media and public. [CNN, 5/20/02]

July 26, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft stops flying commercial airlines due to a threat assessment. [CBS, 7/26/01] He later walks out of his office rather than answer questions about this. [Associated Press, 5/16/02]

July 3l, 2001: The FAA urges U.S. airlines to maintain a "high degree of alertness."

Late July 2001: The U.S. and UN ignore warnings from the Taliban foreign minister that bin Laden is planning an imminent huge attack on US soil. The FBI and CIA also fail to take seriously, warnings that Islamic fundamentalists have enrolled in flight schools across the U.S. [Independent, 9/7/02]

August 2001: Russian President Vladimir Putin orders Russian intelligence to warn the U.S. government "in the strongest possible terms" of imminent attacks by suicide pilots on airports and government buildings. [MS-NBC interview with Putin, September 15, 2001, Fox, September 17, 2001]

August 2001: The FBI arrests an Islamic militant linked to bin Laden in Boston. French intelligence sources confirm that the man is a key member of bin Laden's network and the FBI learns he has been taking flying lessons. At the time of his arrest the man is in possession of technical information on Boeing aircraft and flight manuals. [Reuters, September 13 2001]

Late summer 2001: Jordanian intelligence agents go to Washington to warn that a major attack is planned inside the U.S. and that aircraft will be used. Christian Science Monitor calls the story "confidently authenticated" even though Jordan later backs away from it. [Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02]

August 6, 2001: The CIA also presents a warning to the President, explicitly concerned with terrorism inside the United States, indicating that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. Actual content of this message has been the subject of considerable debate, with White House officials understandably downplaying its significance. [Time magazine, May 16, 2002; New York Times, May 16, 2002]

August 15, 2001: An alert civilian instructor at a Minnesota flight school calls the FBI: "Do you realize that a 747 loaded with fuel can be a bomb?" The next day, Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested. After investigating Zacarias Moussaoui's past, the FBI (with the help of French Intelligence) learns that he had Islamic extremist connections. They also knew he was interested in flight patterns around New York City, and that he had a strong desire to fly big jets, even though at the time he didn't have a license for flying even a Cessna.

August 20, 2001: The French government strongly informs high level American authorities about pending attacks on American targets, using commercial aircraft a

August 8-23, 2001: Two high ranking Israeli Mossad agents come to Washington to warn the FBI and CIA that up to 200 terrorists have slipped into the U.S. and are planning an imminent major assault in the U.S. Indications point to a highly visible target. [Telegraph, 9/16/01; Los Angeles Times, 9/16/01; “Fox News,” 5/17/02] The Mossad gives the CIA a list of terrorists. A major Israeli spy ring was hard on the heels of at least four members of the 9/11 hijackers, including lead hijacker Mohammed Atta. [BBC, 10/2/01]

August 24, 2001: The head of the Mossad reports the imminence of an Arab attack against American targets; a similar report was made by the Mossad on September 7, 2001.

August 24, 2001: Frustrated with lack of response from FBI headquarters about detained suspect Moussaoui, the Minnesota FBI begins working with the CIA. The CIA sends alerts calling him a "suspect 747 airline suicide hijacker." Three days later an FBI Minnesota supervisor says he is trying keep Moussaoui from “taking control of a plane and fly it into the WTC." [Senate Intelligence (Hill #2), 10/17/02] FBI headquarters chastises Minnesota FBI for notifying the CIA. [Time magazine, 5/21/02]

August 2001: Britain gives the U.S. another warning about an Al Qaeda attack. The previous warning was vague. This one specifies imminent multiple airplane hijackings by Al Qaeda. [Sunday Herald, May 19, 2002]

Late August, 2001: The CIA asks the INS to put (these two of the hijackers) Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi on a watch list because of their ties to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. On August 23, 2001, the INS informed the CIA that both Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had already slipped into the country. Immediately thereafter, the CIA asked the FBI to find al-Midhar and Alhazmi. This should not have been difficult, since one of them was listed in the San Diego phone book, and the other took out a bank account in his own name; also, an FBI informant happened to be their roommate.

September 10, 2001: NSA intercepts two messages in Arabic. One message read: “Tomorrow is zero hour,” and the second: “The match begins tomorrow.” [New York Times, August 10, 2002; Reuters, June 19, 2002] On June 19, 2002, CNN reported the contents of these two National Security Agency intercepts. Other news outlets, including the Washington Post, also reported on the intercepts. [New York Times, August 10, 2002]

A particularly urgent warning was received the night before the attacks, causing some top Pentagon brass to suddenly cancel travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of “sudden security concerns.” [Newsweek, 9/12/2001] “Why that same information was not available to the 266 people who died aboard the four hijacked commercial aircraft may become a hot topic on the Hill." [Newsweek, 9/13/2001]

September 11, 2001: For 35 minutes, from 8:15 AM until 9:05 AM, although widely known within the FAA and the military that four planes have been simultaneously hijacked and taken off course, no one notifies the President of the United States. It is not until 9:30 AM that any Air Force planes are scrambled to intercept, but by then it is too late. This means the National Command Authority waited for 75 minutes before scrambling aircraft, even though it was known that four simultaneous hijackings had occurred -- an event that has never happened in history. [CNN; ABC; MS-NBC; Los Angeles Times; New York Times]

Department of Defense (6/1/01) and FAA (7/12/01) procedure: In the event of a hijacking, the FAA hijack coordinator on duty at Washington headquarters requests the military to provide escort aircraft. Normally, NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) escort aircraft take the required action. The FAA notifies the National Military Command Center by the most expeditious means. [DoD, 6/1/01; FAA, 7/12/01; FAA, 7/12/01] If NORAD hears of any difficulties in the skies, they begin the work to scramble jet fighters [take off and intercept aircraft that are off course]. Between September 2000 and June 2001 fighters were scrambled 67 times. [AP, 8/12/02] When the Lear jet of golfer Payne Stewart didn’t respond in 1999, F-16 interceptors were quickly dispatched. According to an Air Force timeline, a series of military planes provided an emergency escort to Payne’s stricken Lear about 20 minutes after ground controllers lost contact with his plane.[Dallas Morning News, 10/26/99]

September 11, 2001:

8:20 AM (approx.): Air traffic controllers suspect Flight 11 has been hijacked. [New York Times, 9/15/01]

8:40 AM: NORAD is notified of hijacking. [New York Times, 10/16/01; Washington Post, 9/15/01]

8:46 AM: Flight 11 crashes into the World Trade Center north tower (approximately 26 minutes after controllers lost contact). [New York Times, 9/12/01]

8:46 AM: Bush later states, "I was sitting outside the classroom and I saw an airplane hit the tower. The TV was on.” [CNN 12/4/01] “When we walked into the classroom, I had seen this plane fly into the first building.” [White House, 1/5/02]

8:52 AM: Two F-15s take off from Otis Air Force Base. [Washington Post, 9/15/01] They go after Flight 175. Major General Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, states "the pilots flew like a scalded ape, topping 500 mph but were unable to catch up to the airliner. We had a nine-minute window, and in excess of 100 miles to intercept 175. There was just literally no way.'' [Dallas Morning News, 9/15/01] F-15's fly at up to 2.5 times the speed of sound (1875 mph or 30+ miles a minute or 270+ miles in nine minutes) and are designed for low-altitude, high-speed, precision attacks. [BBC]

8:56 AM: By this time, it is evident that Flight 77 is lost. The FAA, already in contact with the Pentagon about the two hijackings out of Boston, reportedly doesn’t notify NORAD of this until 9:24, 28 minutes later. [New York Times, 10/16/01]

9:03 AM: Flight 175 crashes into the south WTC tower (23 minutes after NORAD notified, 43 minutes after air traffic control lost contact with pilots). [New York Times, 9/12/01, CNN, 9/12/01]

9:10 AM: Major General Paul Weaver states Flight 77 came back on the (radar) scope at 9:10 in West Virginia. [Dallas Morning News, 9/15/01] Another report states the military was notified of Flight 77 several minutes after 9:03. [Washington Post, 9/1/01]

9:24 AM [? – see above]: The FAA, who 28 minutes earlier had discovered Flight 77 off course and heading east over West Virginia, reportedly notifies NORAD. A Pentagon spokesman says, "The Pentagon was simply not aware that this aircraft was coming our way." [Newsday, 9/23/01; New York Times, 9/23/01] Yet since the first crash, military officials in a Pentagon command center were urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do. [New York Times, 9/1/01]

9:28 AM: Air traffic control learns that Flight 93 has been hijacked. [MSNBC, 7/30/02]

9:38 AM: Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon (42 minutes or more after contact was lost, one hour after NORAD notification of first hijacking). [New York Times, 10/16/01; CNN, 9/12/01]

10:10 AM: Flight 93 crashes in Pennsylvania (42 minutes after contact was lost). [CNN, 9/12/02]

September 12, 2001: Senator Orrin Hatch says the US was monitoring bin Laden supporters and overheard them discussing the attack. [ABC, 9/1/01; Associated Press, 9/12/01]

September 13-19, 2001: Members of bin Laden's family are driven or flown under FBI supervision to a secret assembly point in Texas and then to Washington, where they leave the country on a private charter plane when airports reopen three days after the attacks. [New York Times, September 30, 2001]

In all of the speculations concerning pre-knowledge of this attack, one concept stands out above all the denials and accusations:

How could an obviously sophisticated terrorist plan involving perhaps as many as 50 identified persons and in training for at least two years, possibly escape the notice of our intelligence services, especially the CIA or the NSA? When one considers the number of people involved in this plot, the wide-spread geographical locations of the plotters, the fact that most of them used a telephone system long known to be thoroughly and completely compromised by the US NSA, for international calls, and that large amounts of cash were transferred from foreign banks to American accounts, the idea that none of the American intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies had the slightest warning of impending disaster, is completely impossible to believe.

Triumph of marketing

Reality has intruded on the president's finely honed image - both Katrina and 9/11 found him missing in action

by Gary Younge
Guardian Weekly

The appeal of any presidential candidate is based on a "gut reaction, unarticulated, non-analytical, a product of the particular chemistry between the voter and the image of the candidate", argued Richard Nixon's speechwriter Raymond Price. "[It's] not what's there that counts, it's what's projected." And that projection, he continued, "depends more on the medium and its use than it does on the candidate himself". In other words the American presidency is not just a political role but a performative one.

Over the past six years George Bush's performance, both in office and on the campaign trail, has often been less than stellar. But his packaging has, for the most part, been exemplary. He has been projected as a man of the people and a man of action.

Never mind that he did precious little for the first 40 years of his life and that most of what he did achieve came courtesy of his father's connections. Image was everything. This was the MBA candidate who would take care of business - literally and metaphorically; the blue-blood whose folksy affectations turned blue states red; the affable jock who created a softball team called Nads in college just so that he could make banners saying, "Go Nads".

Liberals ridiculed Bush for being ignorant about the rest of the world, but what many of them failed to grasp is that this is precisely what so many of their countrymen liked about him. He didn't know the name of the president of Pakistan, and nor did they. The fact that he mangled his syntax was taken not as evidence that he had squandered an expensive education but as a sign of his unrehearsed folksiness. His supporters like the fact that he doesn't think too much. He's not a ditherer but, in his own words, "the decider".

Only twice did reality intrude on this meticulously constructed and carefully choreographed image: first after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and then almost exactly four years later, after Hurricane Katrina. Those two events represent the zenith and the nadir of Bush's presidency. In the wake of 9/11, 69% of Americans believed that he was a president who "cared about people like them"; 75% thought he was "a strong and decisive leader". After Katrina, those numbers were 42% and 49% respectively. Within a month of 9/11, Bush's approval ratings had hit a giddy 92%; within a month of Katrina, they were down to 40%.

Today he stands between the two anniversaries that have come to define his tenure in office. Last week marked a year since Katrina flooded New Orleans, exposing his administration as aloof and incompetent - an impression from which he has never recovered. This week's ceremonies will revive memories of a commander in chief who was tough and resolute - an image he is desperate to resurrect.

On both anniversaries the dead will be commemorated. But the public discussion of why they died and what should be done to prevent more similar deaths reflects two very different notions of what kind of superpower America aspires to be. They are, if not contradictory, at least in conflict.

A period of doleful introspection last week over how the world's wealthiest nation could treat its poor so shabbily will now be followed by a flag-waving orgy hailing patriotic resilience in the face of a vicious attack. If these anniversaries reveal a lot about Bush, they also tell us a great deal about America.

On both occasions Bush displayed not a commanding presence but a conspicuous absence. On hearing of the terrorist attacks, he finished reading My Pet Goat to schoolchildren in Florida before zigzagging across the country for fear that he too would become a target. This did little to inspire confidence in the nation in its hour of need.

William Bennett, who was the drug tsar in Bush Sr's administration, said: "This is not 1812. It cannot look as if the president has run off, or it will look like we can't defend our most important institutions." The late Washington Post columnist Mary McGrory concluded: "Bush said the attack was a 'test' for the country. It was also one for him. He flunked."

Bush did not arrive in New York for four days. In New York, Newsday's Ellis Henican pleaded: "I know we're all rallying round the president now, and here I've been, rallying like everybody else. But the hours are passing. The body count is rising. The question can't wait much longer. New York has a right to know. Where are you, Mr President?"

The fact that after just five years this is remembered as his finest hour is a triumph of image over reality. The nation felt the need for a strong leader. When Bush was found lacking, his consigliere, Karl Rove, projected one.

When Katrina came, Bush was again missing in action. While the Gulf coast lay in ruins, he remained in southern California trying to sell the Gulf war. Too scared to go to New Orleans, where the black and poor pleaded for help, he headed for Alabama and Mississippi. In Mississippi he threw his arm around the Republican senator Trent Lott, who had lost his job as Senate leader a few years earlier for publicly mourning the end of segregation, and said he "looked forward to sitting on the porch" with him.

When it came to contempt for a national crisis, his administration took its cue from the boss. Several days into the crisis, Dick Cheney remained fly-fishing in Wyoming. Meanwhile Condoleezza Rice went shopping at Salvatore Ferragamo in New York and took in a show. When the lights came up, the audience booed her.

With no foreign enemy to deflect attention from its deficiencies this time around, the spotlight remained not only on the administration's callous indifference but on the nation's entrenched fault lines of race and poverty.

September 11 highlighted America's vulnerability as a global superpower; Katrina highlighted how little that superpower status meant to many Americans. The fruits of freedom and opportunity that Bush sought to impose in the Middle East at the barrel of a gun had yet to reach middle America. Black infant mortality in Louisiana is on a par with St Lucia; the life expectancy of a black man in Louisiana is roughly the same as that of a man in Kyrgyzstan.

With Osama bin Laden still at large and much of New Orleans still looking like a bomb site, Bush twice failed to seize the moment to accomplish the immediate task at hand or comfort a traumatised nation. But both times he and his party moved quickly to exploit the chaos to advance their own agenda.

As early as November 21, 2001, Bush asked Donald Rumsfeld: "What kind of war plan do you have for Iraq?" The president continues to link Iraq to the war on terror - he did so in his radio address last week - even though a majority of Americans now reject such a link.

Less than two weeks after Katrina, the Republican congressman Richard Baker reportedly said: "We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn't do it, but God did."

The causes and the solutions for these two tragedies couldn't be more different. But they raise the same two central questions: how can the US use its superpower status, at home and abroad, to make the world a safer, better place for ordinary working people; and what form of collective intuitive malaise persuaded a majority of Americans - albeit a slender one - to check their guts and then choose this man?

Bush Fears War Crimes Prosecution, Impeachment

September 7, 2006
by Marjorie Cohn
Common Dreams

With great fanfare, George W. Bush announced to a group of carefully selected 9/11 families yesterday that he had finally decided to send Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and 13 other alleged terrorists to Guantánamo Bay, where they will be tried in military commissions. After nearly 5 years of interrogating these men, why did Bush choose this moment to bring them to "justice"?

Bush said his administration had "largely completed our questioning of the men" and complained that "the Supreme Court's recent decision has impaired our ability to prosecute terrorists through military commissions and has put in question the future of the CIA program."

He was referring to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the high court recently held that Bush's military commissions did not comply with the law. Bush sought to try prisoners in commissions they could not attend with evidence they never see, including hearsay and evidence obtained by coercion.

The Court also determined that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to al Qaeda detainees. That provision of Geneva prohibits "outrages upon personal dignity" and "humiliating and degrading treatment."

Bush called on Congress to define these "vague and undefined" terms in Common Article 3 because "our military and intelligence personnel" involved in capture and interrogation "could now be at risk of prosecution under the War Crimes Act."

Congress enacted the War Crimes Act in 1996. That act defines violations of Geneva's Common Article 3 as war crimes. Those convicted face life imprisonment or even the death penalty if the victim dies.

The President is undoubtedly familiar with the doctrine of command responsibility, where commanders, all the way up the chain of command to the commander in chief, can be held liable for war crimes their inferiors commit if the commander knew or should have known they might be committed and did nothing to stop or prevent them.

Bush defensively denied that the United States engages in torture and foreswore authorizing it. But it has been well-documented that policies set at the highest levels of our government have resulted in the torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of U.S. prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantánamo.

Indeed, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act in December, which codifies the prohibition in United States law against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners in U.S. custody. In his speech yesterday, Bush took credit for working with Senator John McCain to pass the DTA.

In fact, Bush fought the McCain "anti-torture" amendment tooth-and-nail, at times threatening to veto the entire appropriations bill to which it was appended. At one point, Bush sent Dick Cheney to convince McCain to exempt the CIA from the prohibition on cruel treatment, but McCain refused.

Bush signed the bill, but attached a "signing statement" where he reserved the right to violate the DTA if, as commander-in-chief, he thought it necessary.

Throughout his speech, Bush carefully denied his administration had violated any laws during its "tough" interrogations of prisoners. Yet, the very same day, the Pentagon released a new interrogation manual that prohibits techniques including "waterboarding," which amounts to torture.

Before the Supreme Court decided the Hamdan case, the Pentagon intended to remove any mention of Common Article 3 from its manual. The manual had been the subject of revision since the Abu Ghraib torture photographs came to light.

But in light of Hamdan, the Pentagon was forced to back down and acknowledge the dictates of Common Article 3.

Bush also seeks Congressional approval for his revised military commissions, which reportedly contain nearly all of the objectionable features of his original ones.

The President's speech was timed to coincide with the beginning of the traditional post-Labor Day period when Congress focuses on the November elections. The Democrats reportedly stand a good chance of taking back one or both houses of Congress. Bush fears impeachment if the Democrats achieve a majority in the House of Representatives.

By challenging Congress to focus on legislation about treatment of terrorists - which he called "urgent" - Bush seeks to divert the election discourse away from his disastrous war on Iraq.

Marjorie Cohn, a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, is president-elect of the National Lawyers Guild, and the U.S. representative to the executive committee of the American Association of Jurists.

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